

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00

USIE-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07 IO-10 L-03

NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 TRSE-00 NSC-05 BIB-01 CU-02 /085 W

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O P 171720Z JUL 75

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2757

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 3812

E.O. QQYTW: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR

SUBJECT: MBFR: OPTION III: FRG PAPER ON COMMON CEILING

1. AT JULY 17 SPC MEETING, FRG REP (HOYNCK) SAID HE HAD RECEIVED INSTRUCTIOS RE FRG VIEWS ON DEFINITION OF THE COMMON CEILING IN CONNECTION WITH OPTION III. HE STATED THAT HE HOPED TO CIRCULATE A PAPER BASED ON HIS INSTRUCTIONS. HE HAS NOW GIVEN THE MISSION THE FULL TEXT OF HIS INSTRUCTIONS, WHICH IS TRANSMITTED AT THE END OF THIS MESSAGE. HE INDICATED FRG WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS AT JULY 18 TRILATERAL. HE SAID THAT WHAT FRG CIRCULATES IN SPC WILL PROBABLY BE A MODIFIED, SHORTENED VERSION OF THIS PAPER.

2. THIS PAPER SEES TWO MAIN ALTERNATIVES RE DEFINITION OF THE COMMON CEILING. ONE ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE A NUMERICAL DEFINITION IN PHASE I. HOWEVER, THE PAPER STATES THAT AMERICAN OBJECTIONS TO TIS COURSE CANNOT BE DISREGARDED. THE ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE TO REQUIRE AGREEMENT ON THE COMMON

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CEILING CONCEPT, WHILE SPECIFYING THE "ASYMMETRICAL ORIGINAL SITUATION". FRG PAPER ALSO CALLS FOR AGREEMENT ON THE COLLECTIVE NATURE OF THE REDUCTION COMMITMENTS, EXCEPT FOR SOVIET AND AMERICAN REDUCTIONS.

3. BEGIN FRG TEXT

SUBJECT: MBFR, OPTION III;

DEFINITION OF THE COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING (CCC)

1. THERE IS AGREEMENT WITHIN NATO AS TO THE CENTRAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING (CCC) AS PART OF THE NEGOTIATING CONCEPT OF THE ALLIANCE. WE THINK THAT ALL STEPS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL HAVE TO BE EXAMINED AS TO WHETHER AND HOW THEY CAN SERVE THE REALIZATION OF THIS OBJECTIVE. THIS DOES NOT DIMINISH THE IMPORTANCE OF REDUCING SOVIET TANKS. HOWEVER, IT WILL BE OBVIOUS THAT THIS REDUCTION OBJECTIVE OF THE FIRST PHASE IS SECONDARY TO THE OBJECTIVE OF THE WHOLE MBFR PROGRAMME.

2. WE CAN AGREE THAT, AS FAR AS THE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE AD-HOC GROUP ON OPTION III ARE CONCERNED, THE CCC SHOULD BE QUALIFIED BY THE WORDS "APPROPRIATELY DEFINED". HOWEVER, SUCH A GENERALLY-WORDED DEFINITION OF THE OBJECTIVE REQUIRES THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD AGREE IN DETAIL ON WHAT "APPROPRIATELY DEFINED" MEANS. WITHOUT THIS CLARIFICATION WITHIN NATO, THIS WORDING WOULD BE AMBIGUOUS AND RISKY IN AN INSTRUCTION TO THE AD-HOC GROUP. AGREEMENT TO THE WORDS "APPROPRIATELY DEFINED" DOES NOT EXCLUDE THAT WE SHOULD ILLUSTRATE THE NUMERICAL SCOPE OF CCC.

3. IT RESULTS FROM THE ABOVE THAT A FINAL FORMULATION OF THE RELEVANT PART OF THE INSTRUCTION TO THE AD-HOC GROUP WILL ONLY BE POSSIBLE ONCE COMMON NATO UNDERSTANDING HAS BEEN REACHED ON THE TERM "APPROPRIATELY DEFINED".

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4. IN THE EYES OF NATO, OPTION III IS THE DECISIVE AND ONLY CONCESSION WHICH IS DESIGNED TO OBTAIN AGREEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE OF CCC IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. THIS MEANS THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO SET THE COURSE TOWARDS THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF CCC AS CONCRETELY AS POSSIBLE BY PLACING OPTION III ON THE TABLE DURING THE FIRST PHASE.

5. THERE IS AGREEMENT WITHIN NATO THAT THERE WILL BE NO ADDITIONAL NUCLEAR OFFER AND NO NEW INPUTS OF WHATEVER KIND IN THE SECOND PHASE. THIS MEANS THAT ON THE BASIS OF THE DATA WORKED OUT BY US, IT WILL BE NECESSARY IN THE SECOND PHASE TO DEMAND CONSIDERABLE

ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS FROM THE OTHER SIDE IN ORDER  
TO ACCOMPLISH CCC. THEORETICALLY SPEAKING, TWO  
APPROACHES OFFER THEMSELVES. EITHER,

-) OPTION III IS TIED SUBSTANTIVELY AND IN TERMS OF  
TIME TO THE ACCOMPLISHEMENT OF CCC, I.E. THE END  
OF THE SECOND PHASE, OR

B) IT IS COUPLED WITH THE CONTENT OF THE FIRST PHASE  
WITH THE PROVISIO THAT THIS ALREADY CONSTITUTES AN  
ESSENTIAL DEGREE OF PREPARATION OF THE SECOND  
PHASE WHICH IS THUS MADE MORE COMPELLING.

6. THE TERM" CCC APPROPRIATELY DEFINED" DEMANDS A  
STATEMENT ON

A) THE SUBSTANCE OF CCC, AND

B) ITS MODALITIES.

7 ON THE SUBSTANCE:

A) ANY STATEMENT ON THE SUBSTANCE OF CCC OBVIOUSLY  
DEMANDS THAT ITS STRUCTURE HAS BEEN DEFINITELY  
AGREED AND THAT THERE IS A COMMON ALLIANCE POSITION  
ON IT. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE QUESTION WHETHER  
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CCC RELATES TO GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL OR TO THE  
COMBINED GROUND-AIR PERSONNEL CAN BE LEFT OPEN.

B) OF EQUAL IMPORTANCE IS AN INTERNAL ALLIANCE AGREEMENT  
ON THE NUMERICAL SCOPE OF CCC, INDEPENDENTLY OF  
WHETHER A NUMERICAL DEFINITION IS BEING ATTEMPTED  
ALREADY IN CONNECTION WITH OPTION III OR NOT.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2758  
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C. THE MOST UNEQUIVOCAL SUBSTANTIVE DEFINTION OF CCC  
WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE ONE IN TERMS OF FIGURES. THIS  
WOULD MEAN THAT PUTTING FORWARD OPTION III WOULD  
AMOUNT TO A DEMAN FOR A NUMERICAL DEFINITION OF  
CCC. THE ARGUEMENTS IN FAVOUR OF THIS APPROACH WHICH  
HAVE SO FAR BEEN PUT FORWARD WITHIN THE ALLIANCE ARE  
SOUND. NEVERTHELESS, IT MUST BE ASKED WHETHER TEY  
ARE EXHAUSTIVE. THE AMERICAN OBJECTION THAT THIS  
WOULD ANTICIPATE THE RESLTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN  
THE SECOND PHASE AND WOULD OFFERTHE WP AN OPPORTUNITY  
TO EXERT PRESSURE ON THE MODALITIES TO BE AGREED IN  
THE SECOND PHASE CANNOT BE DISREGARDED. NOR WHOULD  
IT BE OVERLOOKED THAT AN AGREEMENT ON THE NUMERICAL  
SCOPE OF CCC WOULD BE A STRONG ARGUMENT IN FAVOUR OF  
AGREEMENT WITH REGARD TO THE MODALITIES.

D) THE ALTERNATIVE TO THE NUMERICAL DEFINITION CONSISTS  
IN THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF WHAT THE ALLIANCE HAS  
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ALWAYSHAD IN MIND IN DEMANDING AGREEMENT TO THE  
COMMON-CEILINGCONCEPT. MERE AGREEMENT TO THE COMMON-  
CEILING CONCEPT WOULD OBVIOUSLY NOT BE ENOUGH TO  
EXERT A RELIABLE INFLUENCE ON THE REDUCTION  
PROBLEMS OF THE SECOND PHASE. AS WE SEE IT,  
THERE IS AGREEMENT WITHIN THE ALLIANCE ON THIS  
POINT. THE MINUMUM DEMAND WHICH WILL HAVE TO BE  
MADE IS AGREEMENT TO THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF CCC  
IN THE SECOND PHASE. HOWEVER, THIS DEMANDIS ONLY  
USEFUL FOR THE REDUCTON PROBLEMS OF THE SECOND  
PHASE I.E. THE NEED FOR ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS,  
IF AGREEMENT TO THE ACCOMPLSHEMENT OF CCC IS  
LINKED UP WITH AN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE TWO  
SIDES ON THE BASIS FOR THE DATA AGTER THE FIRST  
REDUCTION STEP. IN OUR VIEW, RENUNCIATION OF THE  
NUMERICAL DEFINITION REQUIRES THAT THE ASYMMETRICAL  
ORIGINAL SITUATION SHOULD BE SPECIFIED, THUS  
PROVING THE NEED FOR ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS IN  
ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH CCC.

8. WE BELIEVE THAT THE ALLIANCE WILL HAVE TO CHOOSE BETWEEN THESE TWO POSSIBILITIES, OR IT WILL HAVE TO TRY TO COMBINE THEM . WE DO NOT THINK THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO FORECAST WHICH OF THE TWO ALTERNATIVES WOULD STAND THE BETTER CHANCE OF BEING ACCEPTED BY THE OTHER SIDE.

9. MODALITIES OF CCC:

WE CONSIDER THAT ALREADY THE TERM "COMMON CEILING CONCEPT" WOULD HAVE REQUIRED PRELIMINARY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES ON THE MODALITIES, I.E. CONCERNING  
-THE COLLECTIVE CHARACTER OF THE CEILINGS EXCEPT THE SOVIET AND AMERICAN SUB-CEILINGS,  
- THE LIMITATION TO MANPOWER LEVELS,  
-- THE COLLECTIVE NATURE OF THE REDUCTION COMMITMENTS, AGAIN WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN REDUCTIONS.

10. CONCEIVABLE FILLING-OUT OF THE TERM "APPROPRIATELY DEFINED" BY NATO:

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A) WHAT IS NON-CONTROVERSIAL IS A NUMERICAL FIRING WITHIN NATO OF THE LEVEL OF CCC OR, IN OTHER WORDS, CLEAR AGREEMENT ON WHAT WOULD BE THE LOWEST LEVEL FOR NATO DOWN TO WHICH UNDIMINISHED SECURITY COULD BE ENSURED.

B) IT COULD BE EXAMINED WITHIN NATO WHETHER BOTH OF THE TWO VARIANTS MENTIONED ABOVE FOR THE DEFINITION OF THE SUBSTANCE OF CCC ARE TO THE SAME EXTENT IN THE INTEREST OF NATO. IF THIS IS FOUND TO BE THE CASE, IT MIGHT BE CONSIDERED TO INCLUDE THESE TWO VARIANTS AS TACTICAL NEGOTIATION ALTERNATIVES INTO THE SUBSTANTIVE POSITION FOR VIENNA. IN EITHER OF THESE TWO CASES, THEY WOULD THEN NOT BE FALL-BACK POSITIONS BUT CONSTITUTE A POSSIBILITY TO ARGUE FLEXIBLY ACCORDING TO THE SITUATION OF THE CONFERENCE TABLE. WE THINK THAT SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD, FOR EXAMPLE, BE FAVOURED BY THE FOLLOWING FACTS.:

-THE POSSIBLE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS OF THE DISCUSSION OF DEFINITIONS WHICH HAS BEGUN IN VIENNA CANNOT YET BE FORESEEN;

-THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT ONE OR THE OTHER VARIANT OF THE SUBSTANTIVE DEFINITION WHICH MAY BE EQUIVALENT IN OUR EYES IS MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE WARSAW PACT THAN THE OTHER;

C) WE CONSIDER THAT GENERAL AGREEMENT ON THE MODALITIES FOR

THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF CCC SHOULD BE LINKED UP  
WITH BOTH SUBSTANTIVE DEFINITIONS.

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